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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER & ASSO-
CIATES, a Utah corporation 
Def endOJnt-Appellant. 





Associated General Contractors 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a workman for personal injuries 
claimed to have resulted from the defendant architect's 
failure properly to supervise contract work being per-
formed by the plaintiff's employer. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
Plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant 
Harold K. Beecher & Ass•ociates in the amount of 
$638,135.99 plus interest and costs. 
RELIEF RECOMMENDED BY AMICUS CURIAE 
The Utah Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 
which is filing this brief as Amicus Curiae pursuant to 
an order of the court dated August 29, 1969, believes 
that the judgment should be reversed for the reasons 
hereinafter set forth 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The positi()n of this Amicus Curiae is based pri-
marily upon the legal relations existing among plaintiff, 
defendant, and the employer-contractor involved in this 
caise. It accepts the statements that the plaintiff's re-
covery was predicated upon negligence of the general 
contractor and the failure of the defendant architect 
to properly supervise the contractor. The other facts 




THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT \VAS 
NOT INTENDED TO PERMIT AN ACTION BY AN 
2 
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INJURED WORlG\IAN AGAINST A PERSON 
OTHER THAN HIS EMPLOYER \VHERE AN IN-
JURY RESULTS FROM AN" EMPLOYER'S CON-
CURRENT NEGLIGENCE. 
The deoision of the trial court in the instant case 
necessarily involves complex and bi-lateral questions 
of contribution and indemnity. In bringing the action 
plaintiff relied on that part of 35-1-62 Utah Code An-
notated 1953, which provides: 
''When any injury or death for which compen-
sation is payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrong act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, the injured 
employee, or in the case of death his dependents, 
may claim compensation and the injured employee 
or heirs or personal representatives may also 
have an action for damages against such third 
person." (Emphasis added.) 
Read by itself, the foregoing provision suggests the 
threshold problems inherent in determining the meaning 
of "caused by'' and "not in the same employment." 
Additional problems of construction arise from the 
language used in the second sentence of 35-1-62: 
"If compensation is claimed and the employer 
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action against 
the third party and may bring and maintain the 
action either on its own name or in the name of 
the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
d * * * " (E h . representative of the decease . mp as1s 
added.) 
3 
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The section then provides that afiter payment of 
expense's of the action any recovery against the third 
party will be used to reimburBe the employer or insur-
ance carrie·r in full for all payments made. 
Because of many decisions relating to oontributions 
and indemnity (discussed under Point III) the creation 
of a cause of action in favor of the employer or insurance 
carrier, in a situation in which an employee is injured 
by the concurrent negligence of an employer and a third 
person, woll!ld lead to contradiction and confusion. 
This court has heretofore decided that 35-1-62 (prior 
to the 1945 amendment) was intended to cover "passive" 
as well as "active" negligence of the third party tort 
feasor. In Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Company, 107 
Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944), a truck driver had backed 
his employer's truck into high tension electric wires 
while making a delivery to defendant. It was held that 
the employee had a right of action against defendant 
even though negligence was predicated upon a failure 
to warn rather than an affirmative wrongful act. In that 
caise, however, the terms "passive" and "active" were 
used to refer respectively to acts of omissiion and oom-
mission rather than to the primary and secondary l,ia-
bilities of different persons. The court, in construing 
the section, said : 
"The section was designed to permit the per-
son or firm paying compensation to participate 
in any recovery had from the negligent third 
party.'' 
4 
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Inasmuch as 35-1-62 permits recovery from a third 
peirsion only if the injury is "caused by'' the wrongful 
act or neglect of ·such person, and there is no reference 
to contributing causes, it is arguable that the section 
was meant to cover situations on which the employer 
was not also negligent. It does not seem to contemplate 
situations in which the injury resulted from a concur-
renoe of negligence on the part of a third person and 
the employer if the injury occurs within the scope and 
course of employment within the meaning of the ·work-
men's Compensation Act. 
It might be arg1rnd that prohibition of recovery 
from a third person where the injury results from his 
and the emp1oyer 's concurrent negligence would be un-
fair because it would permit third parties to escape 
liability which should be imposed upon them. 
The matter can perhaps best be resolved not on the 
basit> of whether negligence is "passive" or "active", 
but on whether the employer's negligence or the third 
person's negligence was the primary cause of the injury. 
If the employer's negligence was the primary cause, the 
exclusive remedy be should be under the Workmen's 
Compensation Aet; but if the third party's negligence 
was the primary cause, the employee would be able to 
invoke 35-1-62, provided the employee and the other 
party (or parties) were not "in the same employment." 
Such a construction would achieve fairness, calTy 
out the policies of the vVorkmen 's Compensation Act, 
5 
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and avoid problems ansmg out of classic doctrines of 
contribution and indemnity. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS 
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT "\VERE 
IN "THE SAME EMPLOYMENT." 
Under 35-1-62 an action may be brought by an in-
jured employee against a third-party tort feasor only 
when the third party is ''not in the same employment.'' 
The provision must refer to others than co-employees of 
an injured employee, becamse under 35-1-60, the right to 
recover compensation under the \V orkmen 's Compensa-
tion Act is the exclusive remedy against not only the 
employer, bwt any officer, agent or empfoyee of the 
employer. Although this court does not appear to have 
expressly defined "the same employment," several de-
cisions demonstrate that it is not limited to "the em-
ployer,'' and his officers, agents and employees. 
The mo·st recent case is Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons 
Co., 50 Utah 2d 20, 86 P.2d 616 (1963), in which defendant 
and plaintiff's employer, another construction company, 
formed a joint venture to build a diversi,on tunnel at 
Flaming Gorge Dam. Plaintiff was injured while work-
ing in the tunnel and obtained compensation for the < 
injuries. He brought an action against defendant, claim- t 
ing that negligence of its employees cauaed the injuries. Ii 
In discussing 35-1-62 the court said: v 
6 
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"The language of the statute preserving an 
action against ' * * * third persons' who are 'not 
in the same employment "' * * ' seems plainly 
designed to apply to strangers to the employ-
ment and not to co-workerrs jointly engaged in the 
same endeavor.'' 
The court held that the joint venture should be 
regarded as the employing unit and that employees of 
both companies were engaged in the same employment 
within the meaning of the section. In so doing it relied 
partly upon the fact that plaintiff worked fairly closely 
with defendant's employees and was directed to drill by 
defendant's engineers. Al1though some reliance was 
placed upon the fact that plaintiff probably could have 
ciontended successfully that he would be covered hy 
workmen's compensation as an employee of defendant, 
this would not be an important factor if the defendant 
were a fellow employee, or an officer of the empl'°yer. 
Yet under the Workmen's Compensation Act such fellow 
employees and officers are as protected as the employer. 
Other reasons advanced by the oourt in the Cook case 
for denying liability are as pertinent to the present case 
as they were there. 
The position of the defendant in the present case is 
somewhat unique. As architect under contract with Salt 
Lake City and Salt Lake County, it was not in any 
ordinary sense an officer, agent or employee of the 
contractor, a co-employee of the plaintiff, a supervisor of 
the plaintiff, or employer of the contract·or. Yet, it had 
attributes of all of these. Its activities were so inter-
woven with those of the contractor and its employees, 
7 
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including the plaintiff, that it must necessarily be re-
garded ais in the same employment. 
One -Of the fundamental tests applied by this court, 
as by those in other juri·sdictions, to determine whether 
an employer-employee relationship exists, is whether 
there is a right of supervision and control. In Weber 
County-Ogden City R. Com. v. Industrial Commission, 
98 Utah 85, 71 P2.d 177 (1937), the court stated: 
''This court, in several cases, has stated the 
principles as generally followed by the courts of 
this country. * * * 'Whenever the employer re-
tained supervision and control of the work to 
be performed, no matter what relation he had 
sought to establish, the workmen under him were 
to be deemed hiis employees'. 
"It may be admitted that the application of 
that principle in those cases was called for by 
the express language of the statute defining an 
independent contractor. Obviously, however, this 
rule is not limited in its application to cases in-
volving a distinction between an independent 
contractor and an employee.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The court further pointed out that the exercise of 
.supervision and control was the most important test to 
determine the existence of an employer-employee rela-
tionship and said that the fact that one person paid the 
employee's wages and had the exclusive right to dis-
charge or suspend him would not prevent the employee 
from being in the service of another person. 
There is no doubt in the present case that the defend-
ant had the right of superv1s1on and control over the 
8 
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plaintiff in connection with the work being done. Indeed, 
it is the alleged failure to properly perform this super-
vision and control that constitutes the whole basis of the 
lawsuit. It is reeognized that most of the cases following 
the Weber County case involve primarily a determina-
tion of whether the employer-employee relationship 
existed. However, if there is sufficient basis, using such 
test, to establish the employer-employee relationship, 
certainly the test should have great materiality in deter-
mining whether the parties were in the same employ-
ment, as was reeognized by this court in Cook v. Peter 
Kiewit Sons Company, supra., when the court placed 
reliance upon the fact that the plaintiff had worked 
closely with defendant's employees, and was directed 
where to drill by its engineers. 
A case in ·which similar principles were invoked is 
Long v. Springfield Lumber Mills, Inc., 214 Ore. 231, 327 
P.2d 241 (1958). The plaintiff was employed by one who 
had entered into a joint venture with the defendant for 
logging of a tract of timber and delivery of logs to the 
defendant's pond, the profits of the venture to be shared. 
Employees of both ciooperated in the unloading of the 
logs and were doing so when plaintiff was injured. Plain-
tiff had driven his truck loaded with logs to the defend-
ant's dumping site and while unloading the logs was 
struck and injured. The agreement between plaintiff's 
employer and defendant required the employer to pr>o-
vide workmen's compensation insurance for his employ-
ees, which he had done. The Oregon court, under a 
somewhat different statute, held that the defendant and 
9 
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plaintiff 'JS employer had joint supervis~on and control 
over the log dump area, and that the two employers were 
engaged in furtherance of a common enterprise, and that 
consequently plaintiff could not bring this action against 
defendant but had to rely on workmen's compensation. 
POINT III 
THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES vVHICH 
COULD FOLLO\Y FROM HOLDING THE DE-
FENDANT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DEMON-
S1!kATE THAT THE POLICIES AND PURPOSES 
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT RE-
QUIRES A BROAD CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
TERMS "IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT" AS USED 
IN 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953. 
While this court has refused to allow contribution 
among joint tort feas·ors, it has applied a generally 
accepted rule that one guilty of only passive or inac-
tive negligence is entitled to indemnity for amounts 
paid to an injured plaintiff from one who was actively 
negligent in causing the injury. See, e.g., Salt Lake City 
v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 155 P.2d 149 (1945 ). 
If an architect can be held liable to an injured em-
ployee of the contractor or a subcontractor for bis 
''pas·sive'' negligence in failing to supervise construc-
tion, presumably be would have a right, in the absence 
of countervailing policy considerations, to obtain indem-
nity from the contractor or sub-contractor whose 
10 
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"active" (or less remote) negligence resulted in the 
injury. If indemnity were allowed against an employer 
for amounts paid by a third person to his employee, the 
policies of the Workmen's Compensafaon Act would be 
circumvented and the employee might do directly what 
he could not do indirectly - obtain a large judgment 
against his employer (finally) for negligent injury in 
the course and scope of employment. Such a result would 
also deprive the employers in the construction industry 
of the protection and certainty that was meant to be 
afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Act. It would 
have a serious effect upon the risks assumed by cpn-
tractor·s in bidding upon public and private construction 
projects and would make it difficult to anticipate such 
ri.sks in connection with the preparation of bids or 
negotiation of the construction contracts. 
If, on the other hand, the court, in accordance with 
the majority rule, should deny indemnity, a third party 
who may be less culpable than the employer would be 
held liable in damages in an unlimited amount while the 
culpable employer would not only have complete pro-
tection against suit but would be entitled, under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, to recover compensation 
paid to the injured employee. 
We do not mean to suggest that the court can or 
should make a policy determination regarding rights, 
obligations or remedies, which is not permissible under 
the language of the vVorkmen 's Compensation Act. That 
is properly a matter for the legislature. However, the 
11 
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policies behind the act and the objectives to be accom-
plished thereby are we11 knovvn to the court. And where 
it is necessary to construe a provision such as "the 
same employment" priovision of 35-1-62, policy con-
siderations may be taken into account in determining 
the legislative meaning. 
There is a conflict among jurisdictions as to whether 
contribution or indemnity should be allowed against the 
employer when a third party tort f easor is required to 
pay a judgment to an injured employee. Most of the 
courts deny the right on the ground that the ,sole obliga-
tion of the employer is under the \Vorkmen 's Compen-
sation Act and consequently the employer and the third 
party tort feasor are not under a common liability to 
the injured or killed workmen. See, for example, Anno-
tation, ''Effects of \Vorkmen 's Compensation A0t on 
right of third person tort feasor to recover contribution 
from employer of injured or killed workmen,'' 53 A.L.R. 
2d. 977; Annotation, '' J,oint Tort Feasors' Act as ap-
plicahle to employer within \Vorkmen 's Compensation 
Act, 156 A.L.R. 467. There are, however, cases which 
do allow indemnity and in fact third party tort-feasors 
have a somewhat greater success in obtaining indemnity 
frlOin concurrently negligent employers than they have 
had in obtaining contribution. See e.g., American Dist. 
Del. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir., 1950); 
Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 201, 48 P.2d 633 (1944); 
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small 
Estates Corporation, 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938). 
The courts in these cases have been able to advance 
12 
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compelling reasons for the decisions. Thus, it is probably 
no answer to say that the problem can be solved at the 
point where the third party tort feasor attempts to 
obtain contribution or indemnity from the employer. In 
situations such as the present, a much more satisfactory 
solution can be arrived at by holding the third party suit 
is not justified either because the injuries were not 
caused by the third party in the sense that he was the 
one primarily at fault (efficient cause), or that the 
parties were engaged in a common endeavor and thus 
in the same employment. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER FROM DE-
FENDANT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM 
THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO 
SUPERVISE HIS ACTIVITIES OR WARN HIM OF 
DANGERS WHEN THE RISK VIAS AS READILY 
OBSERVABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS IT WAS TO 
DEFENDANT. 
The plaintiff was an experienced excavation con-
tractor who was employed to supervise the construction 
of the trench. Any dangers inherent in the construction 
of the trench should have been as readily observable to 
him as they were to the defendant. In fact, since plaintiff 
was employed at the site, and was there continuously, 
the dangers should have been more observable. 
This court has heid in a number of cases that where 
a hazardous condition on land is as easily observable 
13 
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to an invitee or licensee thereon as to the land owner, 
the duty to warn him of such dangers does not exist, 
and the land owner consequently cannot be held negli-
gent for such failure. See Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, 96 P.2d 751, 16 Utah 2d 127 
(1964); Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 751, 
284 P.2d 477 (1955); and DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Com-
pany, 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956). ·while these 
cases dealt with the duty of a land owner to an invitee 
or licensee, there is no reason why the principle should 
not apply to the facts of cases such as this. Both situa-
tions involve neglig·ence of a passive rather than an 
active type, and the principle is but an extension of the 
oontributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO SUPERVISE 
WAS NOT OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
In the recent case of Wells v. Stanley J. Thill and 
Associates, Inc., ............. Mont. ............... , 452 P.2d 1015 (1969), 
the Supreme Court of Montana had occasion to review 
an action by employees of an independent contractor 
against a city and its supervising engineer for injuries 
suffered in a trench cave-in, which had been dismissed 
by the trial court on motions for summary judgment. As 
the defendant architect had done in the present case, the 
defendant engineers in the Wells case had drawn the 
plans and ·specifications for the city, and were to super-
vise on behalf of the city to insure that the contract was 
performed in accordance with the plans and specifica-
tions. 14 
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In upholding the dismissals, the court noted that the 
basis for the trial court's order granting the motions 
was the "independent contractor rule,1' and a deter-
mination that an employee of an independent contractor 
was not qualified for recovery under exceptions to that 
rule which allows recovery to third persons. It was held 
by the Supreme Court of Montana that neither the city 
('owner) nor the defendant engineers were liable to the 
injured employee. 
In discussing the possible liability of the super-
vising engineers, the court said: 
''The plans and specifications prepared and 
furnished by the engineer, which were also made 
a part of the contracit, provided that ' * * • all 
applicable state laws, municipal ordinances, and 
the rules and regulations of all authorities having 
jurisdiction over construction of the project shall 
apply to the contract throughout, and they will 
be deemed to be included in the contrac.t the same 
as though herein written out in full.' The plans 
and specifications also provided for shoring 
where necessary. From that it is clear to this 
court that there were provisions in the plans and 
specifications that safety precautions should be 
taken to insure the safety of employees working 
on the project. Those provisions in the contraet 
made it the duty of the contractor to take all 
necessary safety precautions. 
''On the other hand, the duty of the engineer, 
which duty ran to the city, was to see that a 
certain end result was eventually accomplished, 
namely that the project as finally constructed and 
turned over to the city met the plans and specifi-
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cations it prepared for the city. The engineer's 
real interest was not in the actual construction 
but in a completed project in accordance with the 
plans and specificatiions. 
''There was no duty on the part of the engineer 
to see that [safety] standards set up by the Mon-
tana Industrial Accident Board were met. That 
'1.uty lay with the contractor and with the Indus-
trial Accident Board.'' 
The Montana case adopts principles which have 
been followed by New York's courts for six decades. In 
PC?_tter v. Gilbert, .............. App. Div ............... , 115 N.Y.S. 425 
(1909) the defendant was an architect who drew the 
plans and specificaitions and undert()ok to and did super-
vise the erection and construction of a building. During 
construction, the outer wall of the building collapsed 
killing the plaintiff's intestate, a workman on the job. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to 
use due diligence in the supervisi-0n of construction, and 
it had been his duty to condemn the wall before it fell 
down, because it had been constructed improperly. It 
wa·s further alleged that the improper construction was 
known or should have been known to the defendant. In 
holding the architect not liable, the court said: 
"An architect in preparing plans and specifica-
tions for the construction of a building under 
employment by the owner, is following an inde-
pendent caHing and is doubtless responsible for 
any negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary 
skill in his profession which results in the erection 
of an unfinished structure whereby anyone law-
fully on the premises is injured; * * * but it will , 
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be observed that there is no charge of negligence 
against the defendant with respect to the prepara-
tion of the plans and specifications for the erec-
tion of the building. The plaintiff does allege 
that the architect prepared unsafe plans and 
specifications, but there is no allegation that the 
collapse of the wall was owing to any defect in 
this regard. * * * 
"At most, then, the complaint merely charges 
an omission of duty on the part of the architect 
while acting for his principal, the owner, which 
constitutes only nonfeasance for which he may be 
liable to bis employer, but is not liable to third 
parties. (Citing cases.) The architect would be 
liable to bis employer, the owner, for a f11ilure to 
properly supervise the work; but a failure in this 
regard amounting to no more than nonfeasari.ce 
would not give rise to a cause of action in favor 
of a third party, whose claim would merely be 
that, if the architect had attended to his duties 
more diligently, he w·ould have discovered a de-
parture from the plans and specificatfons by the 
contractor and might thus have prevented the 
accident. * * * 
"It was the duty of the employer of the dece-
dent under his contract with the owner to follow 
the plans and specifications. The supervision 
power conferred upon the architect was to-insure 
this result. * * * 
" * * * The architect owed decedent and every-
one lawfully on or about the premises the duty 
of preparing plans and specifications under which 
the building could be constructed with safety, and 
the decedent's emp}oyer owed him the duty of 
following the plans and specifications; but the 
architect owed no duty of active vigilance to the 
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decedent to supervise the work of the employer of 
the decedent, although be may have owed this 
duty to tl;te owner by whom he was employed.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
The principle announced in Potter v. Gilbert has 
been appr1oved and followed in Clinton v. Bohn, 139 
App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1910); and Olsen v. Chase 
ManhQ,ttan Bank, 9 N.Y.2cl 829, 175 N.E.2d 350 (1961), 
affirming 10 App. Div. 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960). 
CONCLUSION 
A great number of considerations preclude recovery 
by an employer's workman from an architect for its 
failure to supervise the workman's employer. Many of 
these arise out of the need to prevent the use of actions 
against third persons, contributions, and indemnity, to 
reestablish a ''fault'' system supposedly superseded by 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Moreover, the architect owes no contractual duty 
to a contractor's employee, particularly one whose skills 
and training should make him as aware of the danger 
as is the architect. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
Roe, Jones, Fowler, Jerman & Dart 
340 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Utah Chapter, 
Associated General Contractors, 
Amicus Curiae 
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